Stadium For Rent: 16. H. Wayne's World

STADIUM FOR RENT:
Tampa Bay's Quest for Major League Baseball
By BOB ANDELMAN

Wayne Huizenga

16. H. Wayne's World


"I'm no rabid baseball fan.
I'm an average guy, maybe not even average.
I'm not going to sit there and talk to someone
about so-and-so's batting average.
That's not my game.
I'm a businessman."

-- H. Wayne Huizenga, Chairman of the Board,
Blockbuster Video, The Florida Marlins

The death in 1989 of Miami Dolphins owner Joe Robbie, the man who brought professional sports to Florida, might have dealt a crippling blow for baseball expansion in the southern part of the Sunshine State had it not been for the emergence of H. Wayne Huizenga.
Huizenga was the embodiment of the American dream. A college dropout who dreamed large, he bought a garbage truck in Fort Lauderdale and formed his first company, Waste Management Inc. It became the largest garbage company in the world, of course; Huizenga didn't do anything small.
He left the company in 1984 with 4-million shares of stock worth an estimated $150-million. In February 1987 he bought into a Texas video rental company with a handful of retail outlets and a fuzzy notion of becoming a nationwide chain of video superstores. Two months later he took over the company and fine-tuned the picture. Soon, Blockbuster Video became as synonymous with renting videos as McDonalds is with Big Macs.
Blockbuster caught on quickly, expanding across the United States by building new stores or buying competitors. Almost every day, a Blockbuster Video store opened somewhere. By mid-1992 there were 2,935 stores in operation and more coming on-line daily. Other chains competed on a regional basis, but none could match the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, chain's name brand recognition coast-to-coast. In 1991, with Huizenga as its chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Blockbuster Video grossed $1.5-billion in sales. Entertainment Weekly abruptly ranked Huizenga the ninth most important person in the U.S. entertainment industry.
And Blockbuster was mighty in other ways. Early on, Blockbuster management made a decision to avoid X-rated and even some R-rated films. Its refusal to stock The Last Temptation of Christ in the mid-'80s made news and deflated the grosses for the film's producers. The chain stressed family values and themes. A movie that wasn't stocked on video by Blockbuster after its theatrical run wasn't going to earn much money.
Anyone who earns blockbuster bucks -- U.S. News & World Report estimated Huizenga's net worth at $600-million in 1991 -- is going to have a few dollars left over. But Huizenga isn't a man to spend money freely. He spends money only to make more. That's why Huizenga bought half of Joe Robbie Stadium (JRS) for $5-million (and assumed responsibility for half its debt) and a 15 percent interest in the Miami Dolphins for $12-million in March 1990.
"When I approached Joe Robbie about buying into the stadium -- or buying the stadium, because at first I wanted to buy it -- he showed me drawings and a model of the stadium," Huizenga says. "That stadium was designed for baseball from day one. The only thing was, the retractable seats weren't put in. I looked at the economics of bringing baseball to the stadium. You put another 81 events in the stadium, bring another two and a half million people in, all of a sudden that made the stadium investment look very attractive."
He called his good friend Carl Barger, a member of the Blockbuster board of directors and, more important, president of the Pittsburgh Pirates.
"The more questions I asked, the more [buying into the stadium] looked like a good thing to do," Huizenga says. "When I signed the agreement with the Robbies, there was about a three-month lag from the signing to the closing. [During that time] I got more and more interested in baseball. So when word got out that we were going to close the deal, not only did we say we're going to buy part of the stadium but we're going to go forward and try to get an expansion team."
One of the first people Huizenga told about his baseball plans was Frank Morsani, the man who tried to bring a team to Tampa Bay.
"I met with him in Jacksonville before he ever made his bid," Morsani says. "I know Wayne pretty well. People say well, he had this thing with Barger already done. I don't know whether he did or not unless he is an awful good con artist. We were on the Florida Council of 100 together and we had a meeting in Jacksonville. He and I spent a couple of hours together talking about it. He said, 'You deserve baseball. For all you have done ... but I have to put in a bid. I am not going to go to anything elaborate. I am not even going to do anything, just tell them we are here.' That's exactly what the man told me. I was concerned but I didn't think we could lose."
Once he jumped in and formed South Florida Big League Baseball Inc., Huizenga entertained second and third thoughts about the cost. Every time another superstar ballplayer signed a multiyear, multimillion-dollar deal, Huizenga winced. For a man who ran his company by the bottom line, baseball's salary structure looked insane.
"We hired [the accounting firm of] Arthur Andersen & Co., which had experience doing auditing for several different teams," he says. "We ran the numbers and ran the budget. We looked at that and came to the conclusion that we wouldn't be interested in baseball in any city but South Florida."
Several factors coalesced in South Florida, Huizenga says. A lot of young people, drawn by the neon excitement and international flavor of Miami and Fort Lauderdale, relocated from the Northeast to South Florida. Many are baseball fans. The ever-growing Hispanic population was devoted to the game. And South Florida was the U.S. gateway to South America, Central America and the Caribbean regions, where baseball was often more important than politics.
Research showed Huizenga that the vacation pattern of South and Central Americans coming to South Florida arrive in the summertime rather than the winter -- perfect for baseball. He also figured a South Florida team could create weekend getaway appeal.
"Put that together with the fact South Florida is home to more than 4-million people, with the fact we're growing by about 100,000 people a year so that in five years we're going to have another 500,000 people," Huizenga says. "We've got a pretty good-sized market. We went into it with our eyes open."
Owning a sports franchise was not always a goal of Huizenga's. A native of Evergreen Park, Illinois, and a one-time Cubs fans, he no longer followed the game. "I lived on the South Side and the Cubs were the North Side team, but I was a Cubs fan," he says. "The only reason I really wanted to go after it was to be sure that we got it. There were two other groups looking for a team; I wasn't sure they could get the job done."
* * *
The two South Florida groups competing with Huizenga each had its own strengths.
Mike Schmidt, retired Philadelphia Phillies star, lent his celebrity and knowledge of the game to Rick Horrow's group. Horrow -- who was credited with bringing the NBA Miami Heat to town -- formerly served as director of the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority and as president of the Caribbean Baseball World Series. Other members of the group included Arthur Hertz, chairman of Wometco Enterprises; accountant Stephen Feldman; and New York investment banker J. Morton Davis. (Davis made an unsuccessful bid to purchase the New York Mets in 1986.) Their plan was to get a team, then decide where it would play.
"They were pushing all the right buttons in downtown Miami" Ric Green, director of sports development for the Broward Economic Development Council, says.
Another group, led by Miami banker Abel Holtz, declared its intention to see an open-air baseball stadium built on the waterfront in downtown Miami. Holtz's group included Miami banker Lou Pollard.
"Abel Holtz had a rather arrogant demeanor about him," Green says. " 'This is Miami. This is where baseball belongs. This is my town and we are going to have it in my town and it is my team.' "
Holtz and Horrow appealed to parochial Miamians who not only wanted the baseball team in their piece of South Florida but who also were still angry at the late Joe Robbie for relocating the Dolphins from the downtown Miami Orange Bowl to his own stadium on the Dade-Broward county line.
"I don't think anyone thought Joe Robbie Stadium would turn out to be a good ballpark," Green says. "Joe Robbie had irritated so many people when he left the Orange Bowl. That caused a lot of bad feelings."
* * *
All three potential South Florida ownership groups traveled to New York and stated their case to the National League expansion committee.
The expansion committee liked Huizenga instantly. They wondered aloud, did he plan to take on partners?
"My answer was that I preferred to do it alone," Huizenga says. "If they wanted me to take in a partner, one from Dade County, one from Palm Beach, I would have considered that. Their response was, 'No, we like the fact you're going alone.' That made me feel good."
Weather wasn't as easily dismissed. Huizenga acknowledged rain as a potential problem, but told the committee the harsh South Florida rains usually came in the afternoon, ending by 7 p.m. "There will be those times it doesn't," he told the committee. "We will have rain-outs, no question about it. We'll just have to figure out how to make those up on days off."
Giving Huizenga support were reports from the Class A Fort Lauderdale Yankees and Class A Miracle. The minor league teams lacked sophisticated grounds crews, but indicated that as long as their dirt infields were covered during rain, games picked up as soon as a storm passed. (The outfield warning tracks at Joe Robbie Stadium are artificial rather than dirt.)
* * *
Huizenga's attitude toward the expansion process foresaw a win-win-win situation for himself and Joe Robbie Stadium:
1) He might be selected to purchase an expansion franchise that would play 81 games at JRS.
2) Someone else from South Florida could be chosen and be convinced to play at least their first few seasons at JRS.
"On the one hand, we had a facility, such as it was," Huizenga says. "But remember, it was a multipurpose facility. Baseball said, 'We would prefer to have baseball-only, open-air, grass.' The mayor of Miami said, 'We'll build that facility, well build it right down here on the bay.' We thought the other guys may have had the inside track.
"[The Schmidt/Horrow group] said, 'We'll decide where to put the team after we get it.' They figured they'd sign a lease with us once they got a team. And then maybe they'd build [their own stadium] five years later. You see, the other two groups knew we were spending the money to remodel our facility to get it ready for baseball. So if we didn't get baseball, it would only make sense for us to lease them the stadium for a couple years, even if they were going to build their own facility. And we could recover some of our investment."
3) Tampa Bay would host the only team in Florida, but in doing so would make South Florida number one in line for relocation of an existing team.
"That was our game plan from day one," Huizenga says. "We assessed what would happen from reading the newspaper reports and listening to all the people that had been in this thing a long time. St. Petersburg had been in this a long time, Buffalo had been in this a long time. Denver -- it seemed obvious that somebody felt obligated to put one out in the western part of the country rather than two more in the eastern part. There happened to be this time zone without a baseball team and whether that meant anything or not I didn't know but everybody was making a big deal out of it. I felt that politically, Denver was going to get a team.
"I figured St. Petersburg would get a team," he says. "And with the economics of baseball, some of the small market [teams] had to be sold. Carl and I had a conversation about small markets in big trouble and that people didn't really realize the trouble they were in. Some teams make money, but a lot of teams don't make money. It's pretty bad for that guy at the bottom of the barrel. The bottom is in deep trouble."
* * *
Once Huizenga made the National League owners' short list in December 1990 to represent South Florida against Tampa Bay, Orlando, Washington, D.C., Buffalo and Denver in the battle for an expansion franchise, he became the pack's front-runner, surprising even himself.
Tampa Bay, which had pursued a team for 14 years, found itself in the unaccustomed position of playing second fiddle to South Florida and Huizenga. Although the Tampa Bay area -- and its two daily newspapers -- didn't take Orlando, Buffalo or Washington, D.C., very seriously, South Florida was a different threat entirely. It was a genuine metropolis, urbane, sophisticated and international; everything Tampa Bay dreamed of being.
Tampa Bay baseball fans, already thrown a curve when baseball picked Stephen Porter's group to represent the region over hometown favorite Frank Morsani, shook their heads in dismay when "Captain Video," Huizenga, paid Morsani $10,000 for the rights to use the name "Florida Panthers" if he were selected by the National League.
Unlike the battle of wits engaged between the Miami Herald 's Dave Barry and the Orlando Magic's Pat Williams in 1989, the St. Petersburg Times and Tampa Tribune each went for H. Wayne Huizenga's jugular. The slightest bit of controversy or bad news about Huizenga or Blockbuster Video -- the Carl Barger connection, Blockbuster's business dealings with Phoenix Communications and Major League Baseball -- took on great significance. No matter how insignificant.
Huizenga denied that Blockbuster Video's five-year exclusive deal with Phoenix Communications to sell licensed Major League Baseball videos improved his chances with the owners. Blockbuster also became a sponsor of national baseball telecasts in 1990.
And Huizenga's 20-year personal friendship with Pittsburgh Pirates president Barger rocked the boat, too.
"All the bad stuff came out of Tampa/St. Petersburg," Huizenga says. "Those guys did not get all their facts. They wrote from their emotions rather than from the facts. Okay, fine, they can write what they want to write. But they had Carl Barger influencing Danforth. I mean, not in a million years could that happen. You gotta know Doug Danforth. He's chairman and CEO of Westinghouse. He was used to getting pressure all his life from people -- 'I need this, I want that.' Doug Danforth was one of the leading CEOs ever in this country. He was not going to let somebody else make up his mind. Plus, it is not only the expansion committee that makes the decision. The ownership has got to vote. To think that Carl Barger, one guy, who's not even an owner, just a president, an employee -- to think that one employee on one team could go around and influence 26 owners -- there was no way that could happen. Baseball guys couldn't care less what some general manager or president tells them. Plus, it worked just the opposite for us, because Danforth was reading these same newspaper stories and he ended up keeping this thing at arm's length. The other guys [Fred Wilpon, Bill Giles and Bill White] were friendly. They talked to me, they talked to Denver, they talked to St. Petersburg. But because Doug was worried about the perception, he wouldn't even return phone calls."
Barger wasn't Huizenga's only friend in the National League. Tom O'Donnell, president and publisher of the Fort Lauderdale-based Sun-Sentinel newspaper, which is owned by The Tribune Co., parent of the Chicago Cubs, introduced the Blockbuster Video boss to Stan Cook, president of the Cubs.
Huizenga dealt with expansion by deliberately keeping a low profile. He avoided the media as much as possible, concentrating on Blockbuster and his other businesses. He also steered clear of most rallies and other baseball events.
"You could have the whole community 100 percent behind you but the community doesn't vote. Only the owners vote," he says. "What's the point of spending all your time and effort preaching to the choir?"
* * *
There remains considerable speculation that Huizenga was told early on he would receive one of the two franchises and that's why he confidently invested $10-million out-of-pocket to convert JRS from football-only into a baseball stadium.
"The conjecture fits with what most people thought to be the economic decision analysis," Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez says. "Anybody spending $10-million, plus a $100,000 application fee, probably had to expect the outcome. He had a very good idea that he fit the parameters of what they were looking for. But I lost my bet. I thought he'd begin work and not follow through. I didn't see a lot of back-up use for all that [construction] without a baseball team."
When Joe Robbie gave Huizenga his pitch about baseball in JRS, he showed the video magnate a model of the stadium in which the left field seats were removable for baseball. Unfortunately, Robbie had built left field with permanent seats, not knowing when or if baseball would ever come. Huizenga, once he owned a 50 percent interest in the stadium, decided JRS would be a whole lot more convincing as a baseball venue if the movable seats were in place.
"It's difficult to take someone to the stadium and you look out there and you see the goal posts and say, 'Just picture those left field seats coming out.' Well," he recalls, "somewhere along the way, we decided -- 'Why don't we just spend the money and do it.' "
Huizenga calls it "a roll of the dice," but Ric Green, the Broward EDC's sports director, says Huizenga would not spend $10-million on chance.
"Wayne Huizenga is a very smart businessman," Green says. "He didn't get where he is by not doing everything possible. He prepares 120 percent. I don't want to claim the fix was in and I don't want to cast any aspersions on Carl Barger. Everything that Wayne Huizenga could legitimately do I will guarantee you he attempted to do. His people over-prepare him for everything. I would imagine it would be foolish to not say he went to his good friend Carl Barger and said, 'Who could I talk to?' "
"I thought the team was going to St. Petersburg," Huizenga says. "I thought that [converting JRS for baseball] was a long-term decision. Sooner or later we would get a team. Let's say disaster happens somewhere, there was a fire in a stadium, an earthquake, and all of a sudden someone has to move. They're going to have to have a place to go. The stadium in St. Petersburg is booked, because I figured St. Petersburg was going to get the team. So where else are you going to play? We'd be ready. Or if you wanted to buy a team and you could get permission to move it, okay, fine, you better do it quick. You wouldn't want to buy a team and play in a town for two years saying, 'We're going to move two years from now.' That wouldn't work."
As usual, Huizenga's roll of the dice turned up lucky. Two hastily arranged exhibition games in late spring brought out 125,013 fans to JRS, a show of community support that backed up Huizenga's open wallet. The numbers spoke for themselves.
"There were a lot of rumors coming out of Washington [which sponsored spring exhibition games at RFK Stadium] that we had given a lot of those seats away for nothing," Huizenga says. "So we gave [the expansion committee] the attendance figures. I had a video made. We provided the total amount of money taken in on concessions, parking and seat revenue. The only seats we sold cheaper were the seats in left field. You can't get a clear shot in left field because it's moved back. If you were in the upper deck and the guy was catching the ball up against the fence, you couldn't see him. So we sold those as restricted viewing for $2. We probably shouldn't have sold them at all."
Huizenga says the exhibition games let South Florida fans sent a message to Major League Baseball. And baseball heard them, loud and clear.
The spring games came after a bilingual, multicountry campaign to drum up support, including petition drives from Panama to Brazil, Key West to the Dominican Republic.
Volunteers inundated local sports agencies, offering to do anything they could do to help. A group called Baseball Maniacs formed in Fort Lauderdale. Pep rallies were held at the Bayside marketplace in downtown Miami. Sports bars across South Florida participated. So did the Cuban and Latin communities.
Suarez did everything he could -- both as mayor and baseball fan. "One time I was watching This Week in Baseball," he recalls. "They had a segment on broadcasting baseball games in Latin America. I sent copies of that segment to the expansion committee. I tried to convey that this would be very important for Major League Baseball. Forget Miami -- this would be a stage to the world, I told them."
Through the first few months of 1991, Huizenga says he understand South Florida to be running second to Tampa Bay in the minds of the expansion committee. "Everybody knew the Kohls had lots of money," he says. "And everybody told me [Roy] Disney was in that deal. I don't know if he was or not. But I kept seeing the propaganda out of Tampa, that their group's net worth was a billion-five or something. And the guy in Orlando [Richard DeVos], he was a heavy hitter, worth a billion or so. So we weren't the heavy guy in the pot, that's for sure. I figured, we've got to keep plugging away and do our thing, see what happens."
In late May, something happened to Huizenga, something painful. Despite explosive store growth and impressive earnings, Blockbuster's stock tanked, dropping from $14.50 to $8.87 a share in nine weeks. Huizenga personally lost $115-million on paper, about the cost of a National League expansion franchise -- not including players.
The Tampa Bay and Orlando media purred as it lapped up the bad news, making a final attempt to pump up local efforts for one last push. But Huizenga addressed investor concerns about his company's future, convincing Wall Street it had panicked. Slowly, the price edged back up and Huizenga earned back $40-million of his loss.
Maybe Wall Street lost faith temporarily in the video star -- but baseball didn't. Rumors flew that Huizenga was in.
"I started getting phone calls saying, 'Hey, I hear you guys are looking good,' " Huizenga recalls. "It might be an acquaintance. Or I might go to Wall Street on Blockbuster business and I'd bump into some guy and he'd say, 'I was with somebody the other day who works over at the Mets or the Yankees and the word around there is you guys are looking good.' Well, you don't put much credit to something like that. When you stop and think that that's some third-level person in the Yankees organization -- they don't know anything. But then a couple days would go by and I'd hear the same rumor two or three times and I'd say, 'Whew, there's too many rumors.' "
* * *
Guys like Ric Green, the Broward EDC's sports director, and his counterpart, Bill Perry III, executive director of the Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority, were easier to reach than Huizenga and his lieutenants. So they heard all the latest rumors.
Outrageous rumors had it that Huizenga made a deal with (University of Miami baseball coach) Ron Fraser to be his general manager, Green recalls. "They said he offered Blockbuster Video franchises to Bill White. Friends and reporters called me with this stuff. He was going to build a brand new stadium. He offered to put a dome on the stadium. Not one person was reliable. There was an article in [the failed sports daily] The National. They interviewed Mike Veeck -- Bill Veeck's son -- who has a Florida State League franchise [The Miracle]. Mike was closely tied into this whole process because he owned the team that had the local baseball rights. Mike talked about how baseball will love South Florida. I told [Huizenga assistant] Don Smiley, 'This is a great article, wouldn't you say?' and he said, 'No, I hate it because baseball owners hate Bill Veeck.' Oh, shit. Here you think you got some good publicity and ... Oh boy."
* * *
Anyone living in or visiting South Florida in May 1991 that didn't know the region had a chance to get a baseball team must have had his head in the sand. The anticipation was palpable.
Instead of wondering where the two expansion teams would be placed, the question became who would be number two to South Florida. Would baseball place two new teams in Florida -- with Tampa Bay second -- or would it go with geographic diversity and make its second pitch to Denver?
"By the end of the whole process, everybody was saying South Florida didn't have any weaknesses," Mayor Suarez says. "I spoke to Doug Danforth and he said South Florida sounded good to him."

END CHAPTER 16


Acknowledgements

Introduction

Meanwhile, in San Francisco . . .

One. Where Did All My Friends Go?

Chapter 1. About Last Night
Chapter 2. For a Team to Be Named Later
Chapter 3. Is It Later, Yet?

Two. Blame It On Bowie

Chapter 4. The Egg
Chapter 5. The Chicken
Chapter 6. Don't Build It. We Won't Come.
Chapter 7. Taking Away Tom's Bone
Chapter 8. Don't Screw With Mr. Dodge
Chapter 9. Anatomy of a Fast Pitch

Three. We Are the Competition

Chapter 10. Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard
Chapter 11. Such a Bargain!
Chapter 12. The Pitch
Chapter 13. Happy Holidays, Mr. Morsani
Chapter 14. The Dog and Pony Show
Chapter 15. That's Not Funny, Pat
Chapter 16. H. Wayne's World
Chapter 17. Deep Pockets, Short Arms
Chapter 18. Heartbreak City

Four. Dream On

Chapter 19. Something's Got to Give
Chapter 20. Wish I May, Wish I Might
Chapter 21. The Gameboys of Summer

Five. Take a Giant Step

Chapter 22. The Artful Dodger
Chapter 23. Do You Know the Way to San Jose?
Chapter 24. Four Guys Named Vincent
Chapter 25. Make The Check Payable To Bill White
Chapter 26. Bottom of the Ninth, Two On, Two Out, Winning Lawyers in Position

Epilogue

About the Author

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